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Introduction 
The term ’constitutional economics’ or ’constitutional political economy’ 
was introduced in the 1970s to designate a distinct strand of research that 
emerged from the somewhat older public choice branch of economics.
1 In the 
1990s, constitutional economics developed into a major research programme. 
At a time of massive worldwide constitutional change, it came as no surprise 
that the focus of public choice discussion was shifted away from ordinary 
political choices to the institutional-constitutional structure within which 
politics takes place. 
However, the subject matter is not new. Broadly conceived, constitutional 
economics is an important component of a more general revival of the classi-
cal approach. It draws substantial inspiration from the encompassing theoretical 
perspective and the reformist attitude that were characteristic of Adam Smith’s 
vision. Buchanan’s constitutional political economy can be considered the 
modern-day counterpart to what Smith called ’the science of legislation’, an 
academic enterprise that seeks to bring closer together again the economic, 
social, political, philosophical and legal perspectives that were once part of 
the study of ’moral philosophy’. 
One might be tempted to characterize constitutional political economy 
simply - and somewhat narrowly - as ’the economic analysis of constitu-
tional law’. It cannot be denied that the examination of real-world constitutions 
using the perspective of modern constitutional political economy is an inter-
esting exercise and may provide a kind of test for the usefulness of this 
approach. Reference can be made to several interesting case studies.
2 How-
ever, such a definitional strategy may tend to be somewhat misleading. The 
use of the term ’constitutional’ in the self-description of the subdiscipline is 
largely metaphorical. Constitutional economics as a research field comprises 
but is at the same time broader than, ’the economic analysis of constitutional 
law’. 
Constitutional economics as a scientific subdiscipline is characterized by a 
particular kind of orientation in social analysis. Whereas orthodox economic 
analysis attempts to explain the choices of economic agents, their interactions 
with one another and the results of these interactions, within the existing 
legal-institutional-constitutional structure of the polity, constitutional eco-
nomic analysis attempts to explain the working properties of alternative sets 
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of legal-institutional-constitutional rules that constrain the choices and ac-
tivities of economic and political agents. The emphasis is on the rules that 
define the framework within which the ordinary choices of economic and 
political agents are made. Thus constitutional economics analysis involves a 
’higher’ level of inquiry than orthodox economics. It examines the choice of 
constraints as opposed to the choice within constraints. Thus the constitu-
tional economist has nothing to offer by way of policy advice to political 
agents who act within defined rules. On the other hand, the whole exercise is 
aimed at offering guidance to those who participate in the discussion of 
constitutional change. Constitutional economics offers a potential for norma-
tive advice in constitutional matters, whereas orthodox economics offers a 
potential for advice to the practising politician. 
A preliminary illustration may be drawn from the economics of monetary 
policy. Events in the European Monetary System, on the one hand, and 
monetary disintegration in the former Soviet Union, on the other, have re-
vived interest in the question of how to design and choose a monetary regime 
for both parts of Europe that ensures monetary stability. The constitutional 
economist is not directly concerned with determining whether monetary ease 
or monetary restrictiveness is required for furthering stabilization objectives 
in a particular setting. However, he/she is directly concerned with evaluating 
the properties of alternative monetary regimes (such as complete monetary 
union versus currency competition).
3 
Of course, there exists a whole set of subdisciplines that all draw some 
attention to the legal-political constraints within which economic and politi-
cal agents choose. Differences can be identified, however. Thus public choice, 
in its non-constitutional aspects of inquiry, concentrates attention on analyses 
of alternative political choice structures and on behaviour within those struc-
tures. Its focus is on predictive models of political interactions, and is a 
preliminary stage in the more general constitutional inquiry. Law and eco-
nomics remains somewhat closer to orthodox economic theory than 
constitutional economics or public choice. The standard efficiency norm 
remains central, both as an explanatory benchmark and as a normative ideal. 
One of the leading journals of the subdiscipline is Constitutional Political 
Economy (CPE). Some intuitive understanding of what constitutional politi-
cal economy is all about can be gained from explaining the logic behind the 
logo of this journal, which is drawn from Greek mythology. The logo is a 
representation of the familiar Homeric account of how Ulysses heard the 
sirens singing, and survived (Kliemt and Brennan, 1990). Ulysses wanted to 
hear the exquisite voices of the sirens. He was passing close by and, in 
principle, there was nothing to prevent him from listening to them while 
continuing his journey. However, he recognized that the power of these 
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the sirens were located. The ship would be wrecked and he would be unable 
to continue his journey. 
Formally, Ulysses faced a problem of time inconsistency in his optimal plan. 
His optimal plan was to listen to the sirens and then continue his journey. But 
this was time- inconsistent because, once he had embarked on the plan by 
listening to the sirens, he would not have been able to implement the later part 
of the plan, the rest of his journey. By contrast, a time-consistent optimal plan 
is one that specifies a sequence of actions (At, At + 1, At + 2 and so on), one for 
each moment in time (T, T + 1, T + 2 and so on), which enjoys the property that 
the individual will actually choose in each time period the action specified by 
the plan. Thus, when T + 1 occurs, having undertaken At in T, the individual will 
still choose At+1 as the best action rather than some other, and so on.
4 
The time inconsistency arises because the sirens affect Ulysses’ prefer-
ences. His perception of the best action changes in the middle of the plan and 
this leads him to deviate from the original version. Ulysses implemented his 
optimal plan by denying himself freedom at the later stage of the plan. 
Having instructed his men to tie him to the mast and to ignore any orders to 
do anything other than sail past the rocks, he told them to plug their ears and 
row. Thus, Ulysses established for himself a private constitution, a set of 
more or less binding rules that constrain his future choices. By exploiting 
elements of his natural and social environment, Ulysses was able to subvert 
certain inclinations of his future self, inclinations that he knew would be 
destructive of his overall interests but which would nevertheless prove irre-
sistible when they arose. 
Though the theory of private constitution is a (small) part of the domain of 
constitutional political economy (Buchanan, 1990, p. 3), the principal issue 
for constitutional political economy is that of forming a mutually agreeable 
constitution for social arrangements among a community of persons. Ulysses 
is therefore to be seen not merely as a single actor but more particularly as 
representing society as a whole, and the mast and rope are to be identified as 
the rules by which ordered society is governed. 
As Kliemt and Brennan (1990, p. 125) point out, some care must be taken 
in interpreting any such image. Following the individualist methodology, 
’social action’ must be decomposed into the actions of the individuals of 
whom society is made up; the exercise of social binding, specifically, must be 
seen as an intrinsically multilateral activity. Each agrees to a set of rules and 
procedures because this is the price each must pay to restrict the conduct of 
others. ’Weakness of the social will’ will arise precisely because it is 
opportunistically rational for any individual to depart from the collectively 
agreed rules and procedures. 
Moreover, in the setting with which constitutional economics is concerned, 
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excessively costly. The tools of enforcement and maintenance must them-
selves be socially constructed. Human beings are not bound by nature to 
pursue rules: they are endowed with the capacity to deviate from rules if it is 
profitable to do so. Accordingly, we must search out rules which so order 
individuals’ behaviour that it is individually profitable for most people to 
keep and enforce those rules most of the time. The gains from violation 
should not be too great. The analysis of the kind of rules and the associated 
institutional apparatus that exhibit these properties represents a centrepiece 
of constitutional political economy as an area of inquiry. 
Theoretical foundations and intellectual origins: the Wicksellian 
ancestry 
Constitutional economics is informed by an explicit methodological indi-
vidualism (Buchanan, 1990, p. 13). Only individuals choose and act. Whatever 
phenomena at the social aggregate level we seek to explain, we ought to show 
how they result from the actions and interactions of individual human beings 
who, separately and jointly, pursue their interests as they see them, based on 
their own understanding of the world around them (Vanberg, 1994, p. 1). 
Beyond the logical - and largely tautological - presuppositions of individu-
alism, orthodox public choice models usually obtain operational content through 
the postulate of homo economicus. Individuals are assumed to be utility-maxi-
mizing and to seek their own interests. It is increasingly recognized, however, 
that at least a part of the traditional public choice emphasis had been wrongly 
placed. Thus the emphasis is shifted away from the motivational postulates for 
political actors to the incentive structures of politics. In Buchanan (1993a, 
p. 69) it is argued that the seminal Alchian (1950) analysis of the market’s 
analogue to evolutionary selection can be extended to politics in a relatively 
straightforward fashion, the difference between the two evolutionary models 
lying in the compatibility with overall efficiency. The structure of the politics in 
which politicians act requires them to act contrary to the public interest if they 
are to survive at all. For the constitutional economist the relevant question then 
becomes: ’How can constitutions be designed so that politicians who seek to 
serve "public interest" can survive?’ (Buchanan, 1993b). 
The germs of the recent re-emergence of the research programme of con-
stitutional political economy were contained in The Calculus of Consent 
(Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; also Wagner, 1988 and Tullock, 1987). The 
distinguishing feature of the Buchanan and Tullock approach to the study of 
political institutions from a normative viewpoint was to treat the political 
process by which individuals advance their interests as one of exchange. In 
adding this second element - ’politics as exchange’ - to the utility-maximiz-
ing models for individual choice behaviour in politics, they were directly 
influenced by the great work of Knut Wicksell. Constitutional economics II   22 7 
Constitutional political economy could be characterized as ’Wicksellian’ 
political economy. In his basic work on fiscal theory, Wicksell (1896) called 
attention to the significance of the rules within which choices are made by 
political agents, and he recognized that efforts at reform must be directed 
towards changes in the rules for making decisions rather than towards modi-
fying expected results through influence on the behaviour of the actors. In 
order to take these steps, Wicksell needed some criterion by which the possi-
ble efficacy of a proposed change in rules could be judged. He introduced the 
now familiar (near to) unanimity or consensus test. Thus, for Wicksell, ’the 
consent of the governed’ was the point of departure for the evaluation of 
government activities. As he concluded: 
It is a necessary condition that expenditures and the means of financing them be 
voted upon simultaneously. ... If this procedure should become general practice, a 
very important practical step would have been taken in the direction of the system 
proposed in this essay. The requirement of the veto right of the minorities would 
follow sooner or later as a logical and necessary consequence. ... It stands to 
reason that a combination which satisfies everyone ... must be imbued with more 
justice than any other which might appeal more to an accidentally greater half of 
those interested, but which would be at the expense of the others. Once this is 
conceded, the right of minority veto is already recognized in principle. (Wicksell, 
1896 [1962], p. 116) 
This ’Wicksellian’ idea has had considerable influence on Buchanan’s 
approach. Buchanan maintains that politics must be understood according to 
the model of market exchange. Thus the political process is conceptualized as 
one of mutually beneficial exchange. It is for this reason that he is drawn to 
unanimity as a collective decision rule. Since the choice among rules is more 
a social choice than an exchange, the form of voluntary exchange is political 
consent. At the most fundamental level of constitutional choice, consent 
serves as the basis of justification. It provides the ultimate criterion of effi-
ciency. Unlike other economists who have emphasized either the efficiency 
or rationality of rules, Buchanan is concerned exclusively with whether or 
not people consent to them. Through the emphasis on ’consent’ or ’agree-
ment’ as a normative yardstick, the research programme of constitutional 
political economy became closely related to the contractarian tradition in 
political philosophy (Buchanan, 1975). In contrast with Paretian ’optimum 
resource allocation’, a situation of ’Wicksellian efficiency’ will be character-
ized by the fact that citizens are satisfied that the extant system of rules, 
institutions and policies of their society is free from improper coercion 
(Wiseman, 1990, p. 110). 
Thus Buchanan and traditional economic analysts develop the relationship 
between autonomy and efficiency in exactly opposite ways (Coleman, 1990, 
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property of social states independent of the process of voluntary exchange. 
For example, the perfectly competitive market is efficient, but the outcome of 
the prisoner’s dilemma is not. And given the logic of the relevant concepts -
especially Pareto superiority - it follows logically that people would consent 
to efficient rules. Consent follows from efficiency. Buchanan puts the matter 
exactly the opposite way. What people consent to is efficient. Efficiency 
follows from consent. 
As Buchanan sees it, contractarian political institutions typically exhibit 
three attributes. First, the place of the individual is central to the contractarian 
vision of the political process. Individuals’ own - and necessarily subjective 
- evaluations, their interests and values constitute the relevant benchmark or 
criterion against which the efficiency or desirability of alternative sets of 
rules are to be judged. Contractarianism complies with this criterion by 
according each individual equal treatment at the constitutional stage. This 
normative individualism should be distinguished from the methodological 
individualism discussed above. 
Second, there is the fundamental distinction between actions taken within 
the constitutional rules, and changes in the rules themselves. The latter are to 
occur only at the constitutional stage and ideally are made using the unanim-
ity rule. Whereas Wicksell did not move beyond the development of criteria 
for evaluating policy alternatives one at a time, Buchanan and Tullock (1962) 
operationalized Wicksell’s (1896) insights and extended the applicability of 
the unanimity or consensus criterion from the level of particular proposals to 
the level of rules - to constitutional rather than post-constitutional or in-
period choices. The image of political activity as a two-stage process, first 
developed in The Calculus of Consent, recurred in many of Buchanan’s later 
writings as a sort of normative benchmark or yardstick by which to measure 
the quality of a community’s political institutions. 
Third, actions taken in the second stage of the political process should be 
effectively constrained by the rules written in the first, constitutional stage, 
and this is true, not only for the individual citizen, but also for the elected 
representatives, and the bureaucrats and jurists who administer the system. 
The shift of the Wicksellian criterion to the constitutional stage of choice 
has some remarkable consequences. It becomes conceivable to allow for the 
possibility that preferred and agreed decision rules might embody sizeable 
departures from the unanimity limit, including simple majority voting in 
some cases and even less than majority voting in others (Buchanan, 1987, 
p. 135). The constitutional calculus suggests that both the costs of reaching 
decisions under different rules and the importance of the decisions are rel-
evant. Since both of these elements vary, the preferred rule will not be 
uniform over all ranges of potential political action. The in-period Wicksellian 
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single decision examined. But the in-period violation of the criterion does not 
imply the inefficiency of the rule so long as the latter is itself selected by a 
constitutional rule of unanimity. 
For Buchanan and Tullock (1962, ch. 6) constitutional design was a matter 
of comparing the interdependence costs of public and private decisions over a 
range of activities to determine which activities would be assigned by the 
constitution to the state and which voting rule or choice mechanism would be 
specified by the constitution for each state activity. The best public decision 
rule for each activity was the one that minimized interdependence costs. It 
was specified that the representative individual perceived interdependence 
costs for an activity as the sum of the anticipated external costs levied on that 
individual if not part of the decision set, and the anticipated decision cost 
experienced by the individual if part of the decision set. The sum of both 
external and decision costs was shown to have a unique minimum somewhere 
between the extremes of individual rule and unanimity rule, the exact posi-
tion depending on relative external and decision costs. 
Thus, while it was recognized that unanimity and not majority rule is the 
pivot of constitutional democracy, it was equally demonstrated that ’at best, 
majority rule should be viewed as one among many practical expedients 
made necessary by the costs of securing widespread agreement on political 
issues when individual and group interests diverge’ (ibid., p. 96). 
The general problem of efficient constitution formation and 
maintenance 
The choice situation at the constitutional as well as the post-constitutional stage 
is ususally modelled as a classic prisoner’s dilemma (Figure 13.1), at least in so 
far as it involves potential conflict of interests between rational persons (Gwartney 
and Wagner, 1988a, p. 32; Buchanan, 1993b, p. 2). In ’generalized prisoner’s 
dilemma situations’, that is, social constellations under which individuals, in 
separate and rational pursuit of their own interests, unintentionally but system- 
B 
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C      3,3  1,4 
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D      4,1  2,2 
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atically contribute to an overall outcome that is undesirable for all of them (or 
in any case less desirable than some alternative outcome that could be realized 
by concerted, organized action) there may exist a potential for mutual gains by 
collective action (collective organization). 
Thus the constitution is essentially a contract intended to secure the mutual 
gains from social cooperation and to avoid the dominant defective strategy in 
the prisoner’s dilemma game which leads to a socially inefficient Nash equi-
librium solution. Since the mutual gains from social cooperation constitute a 
public good, the maintenance of the constitutional contract gives rise to a 
problem that will not resolve itself naturally. 
Even when it is supposed that agreement on appropriate rules can be 
achieved at the stage of constitutional contract formation, it should be recog-
nized that individuals and interest groups inevitably will attempt to engage in 
post-contractual opportunism (the problem of constitutional maintenance). 
Thus the agreement, once achieved, must be enforceable. This opportunism 
takes several forms. First, each individual may have an incentive subse-
quently to defect from the cooperative agreement (the compliance or unilateral 
defection problem). Whether or not it is rational for persons to comply with 
rules that they constitutionally may agree on is a matter of contingent, factual 
circumstances. It depends on whether or not the constraints that persons face 
after the agreement, that is post-constitutionally, make it rational for them to 
comply with previously agreed rules. 
A second form of post-contractual opportunism consists of rent seeking 
and special-interest plundering which ultimately reduce the value of post-
contractual cooperation and undermine the constitution itself. Groups of 
individuals have an incentive to seek to capture the instruments of state 
power and to use them as vehicles to enrich themselves in ways that are not 
possible for private citizens. ’Rent seeking’ is a term used by economists to 
describe actions taken by individuals and groups to alter public policy in 
order to gain personal advantage at the expense of others. The social costs 
entailed by this process are called ’rent-seeking costs’ or, by some, ’Tullock 
costs’, after Tullock (1967).
5 Tullock showed not only that the inefficiency or 
social welfare cost of, say, a tariff consists of the Harberger triangle and can 
increase with the Tullock rectangle, but also that the pure transfer involved in 
the creation of tariffs or other privileges will lead market participants to 
expend resources in lobbying and political activities: 
These expenditures, which may simply offset each other to some extent, are 
purely wasteful from the standpoint of society as a whole; they are spent not in 
increasing wealth, but in attempts to transfer or resist transfer of wealth. I can 
suggest no way of measuring these expenditures, but the potential returns are 
large, and it would be quite surprising if the investment was not also sizable, 
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The incentive to engage in rent-seeking activities is directly proportional to 
the ease with which the political process can be used for personal (or interest 
group) gain at the expense of others. In other words, distributional politics is 
viable and tends to become dominant to the extent that differential treatment 
is constitutionally permissible (Buchanan, 1993b, p. 6). 
Tullock (1959) had shown that under any voting system which requires 
less than unanimous approval to implement policies, majority coalitions of 
interest groups will seek to obtain public provision of special interest projects. 
The dominant strategy for any organized interest group in a majoritarian polity 
is to lobby for policies which provide large benefits to its members and 
spread the costs among everyone else. This tendency exists even in liberal 
democracies. Through implicit vote trading, a coalition of interest groups, 
comprising a bare majority of voters, can get all or at least most of their 
favoured projects approved for public provision. Under certain conditions, 
the total costs of these projects can exceed their total benefits, while cost-
spreading through the ’fisc’ induces a rational ignorance of this process on 
the part of the disadvantaged majority. On the other hand, the asymmetric 
distribution of cooperative benefits leads subgroups of the collective to invest 
energy struggling for access to the government’s coercive power. But the 
effort may turn out to cost more than it is worth and the end result will be that 
the collective’s loss purchases the subgroup’s gain (Schmidtz, 1991, p. 91). 
Buchanan and Lee (1991) demonstrate that the gains from politically gen-
erated restrictions on markets, even to organized producing interests, are 
more apparent than real. The analysis demonstrates that, under plausibly 
realistic assumptions concerning coalitions sizes, excess burdens, organiza-
tional costs and rent-seeking outlay, a genuine utility-maximizing calculus 
may dictate support for constitutional prohibition of all market restrictions, 
by all members of the polity, including those producer interests that might be 
considered to be the potentially identifiable beneficiaries of cartelization. 
Principal-agent theory has been used to examine the rent-seeking problem 
(Anderson and Hill, 1986; Merville and Osborne, 1990).
6 The principal, also 
the citizen, grants the agent (the government) the power of coercion. In 
exchange, the agent supplies the principal with public goods. Since the capi-
talized value of public assets is owned collectively, public good outputs of the 
government are like communal resources with widely diffused benefits. It 
soon becomes evident to vote-maximizing agents or legislators that they can 
maximize their political support by significantly reducing the provision of 
public goods to the population at large in favour of greater transfers to 
interest groups. These transfers are financed by general tax collections and 
provide concentrated benefits to designated groups. Such collusion between 
agents and special interest groups will invariably lead to a breaking of the 
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Merville and Osborne (1990) use agency theory to demonstrate formally 
that, in majority-rule political systems, coalitions of minority factions will 
induce politicians to break the constitutional contract systematically in order 
to supply special-interest projects. Unlike contracts in private markets, politi-
cal contracts are much more susceptible to this kind of opportunism. 
Proposed solutions 
Is the rent-seeking trap inescapable? By far the most important problem with 
respect to ensuring the self-enforcing character of a constitutional contract is 
that it must successfully constrain the power of the state itself. 
Substantive restraints versus procedural rules 
Generally speaking, substantive constraints on government have been dis-
missed as ineffective precisely because of the wide latitude they allow for 
reinterpretation. Gwartney and Wagner (1988a, pp. 44-9) make a strong case 
for procedural rules designed to uphold decentralization of governmental 
powers and to prevent the formation of legislative coalitions. Procedural rules 
will provide more effective mechanisms for self-enforcement than will sub-
stantive restraints on government. In their view, the weakness of substantive 
restraints derives from the politicization of the Supreme Court and the ease 
with which legislatures can find alternative ways to implement any given 
policy. They propose procedural rules requiring larger legislative majorities 
for legislative action at higher levels of government, thereby diffusing the 
power of the state to regional and local governments. 
Judicial independence 
Does independence of the judiciary serve the long-term public good? The 
traditional view of the purposes of judicial independence has been attacked as 
naive by law and economics and public choice scholars. Unlike many legal 
contracts, it is argued, there is no third-party enforcer, external to the con-
tract, who can ensure that defectors are caught and forced to comply with the 
terms of the agreement. Although many countries have a nominally inde-
pendent Supreme Court whose purpose is to enforce the constitution, the 
Supreme Court can only do this imperfectly in most cases, because the 
judges themselves are not totally immune from political pressures by groups 
wishing to subvert the original intent of the constitution. Thus, given the 
unreliability of third-party enforcement, and given the strong individual in-
centives to defect from social cooperation, the constitutional contract should 
somehow be self-enforcing if it is to be maintained. 
The interest group theory first advanced by Landes and Posner (1975) 
makes the independent judiciary an integral part of the system of rent seeking 
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cism of the Landes-Posner theory in contained in Boudreaux and Pritchard 
(1994), who argue that the theory is seriously deficient and conclude that the 
United States federal judiciary is truly independent of Congress and the 
president, and that this independence was designed by the US Constitution’s 
framers as a means of furthering sound government. 
A rule of law in politics 
According to Buchanan (1993b) the direction of constitutional reform is 
obvious. If, somehow, the potential for differential treatment is reduced, so 
will be the inducement to rent-seeking behaviour. The off-diagonal solutions 
should simply be made impossible to achieve by the introduction of some 
rule or norm that prevents participants from acting or being acted upon 
differently, one from the other. If the off-diagonal attractors are eliminated, 
then the players operate with the reduced matrix shown in Figure 13.2. Thus 
the constitutional reform measure modifies the original prisoner’s dilemma 
game into a reduced setting in which each player, as a member of a political 
coalition, knows that any choice of an action or strategy must involve the 
same treatment of all players or constituencies (ibid., p. 3). 
B 
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D       X  2,2 
Figure 13.2   Modified prisoner’s dilemma 
If and to the extent that differential treatment is replaced by equal treat-
ment, or by the principle of generality in politics - analogous to that present 
in an idealized version of the rule of law - mutual exploitation will be 
avoided and politicians who seek to serve the ’public interest’ will survive 
and prosper (ibid., p. 6). Thus it seems at least conceivable that rational 
persons, at the stage of entering into the agreement, may recognize the ’rent-
seeking trap’ and engage in concerted effort to escape. 
However, in the hypothetical matrix construction above, the interaction 
was in fact assumed to occur in a state of nature, with each person holding 
equal prospects for membership in the majority and minority coalitions. This 
means that membership was assumed to be symmetrical among all partici- 
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pants. But this assumption may turn out to be too heroic with respect to real-
world settings. 
The prospects may differ among persons and groups of persons so as to 
create divergences in interests which may become a source of disagreement. 
Thus the question remains whether it is possible to modify the constitutional 
choice setting so as to reconcile such possible divergences. It appears that, at 
least from the perspective of potentially-conflicting interests among constitu-
encies, the general problem of constitutional efficiency and survivability does 
not resolve itself naturally. 
Veil of uncertainty and/or ignorance versus the availability of exit options    
Is it possible to specify the conditons under which constitutional agreement 
may be facilitated in real, non-hypothetical choice situations? Is it possible to 
modify the constitutional choice setting so as to reconcile divergences in 
interests? In this respect, two lines of reasoning have been pursued in the 
contractarian and neo-contractarian literature. The first line of argument fo-
cuses attention on the need for a ’veil of uncertainty and/or ignorance’ as a 
precondition for an efficient constitution. 
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) had to present a convincing positive argu-
ment that unanimous consent at the constitutional level was possible at all. 
How can agreement on rules among persons with potentially conflicting 
constitutional interests be achieved? The authors’ characteristic way of ap-
proaching this issue consists of emphasizing the uncertainty confronting all 
individuals taking part in constitutional deliberations. The existence of ’a veil 
of uncertainty’ induces individual participants in a constitutional process to 
prefer rules that do not systematically favour any particular subset of citizens. 
The proposed remedy involves the introduction of some means of ensuring 
people’s inability reliably to foresee their future particularized interests, as 
these may be affected by different rules, thereby inducing people to make 
constitutional choices on some assessment of the general working properties 
of alternative rules, and divorced from particularized interests. Thus agree-
ment is facilitated by whatever increases people’s uncertainty about  the 
particular effects that alternative rules can be expected to have on them. In 
fact the assumption of a ’veil of uncertainty’ was also hidden in Buchanan 
(1993b), discussed above. 
Buchanan’s approach has affinities with John Rawls’s (1971) construction, 
which utilizes the veil of ignorance along with the fairness criterion to derive 
principles of justice that emerge from a conceptual agreement at a stage prior 
to the selection of a political constitution. Thus in Rawls’s construction, the 
prospect of agreement is secured by defining certain ’ideal’ conditions under 
which constitutional choices are hypothetically made. The choosers are as-
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for them to know anything specific about how they will be personally af-
fected by alternative rules. Ignorant about their prospective specific interests 
in particular outcomes, they are induced to judge rules ’impartially’. Poten-
tial conflict in constitutional interests is not eliminated, but the veil of ignorance 
transforms potential interpersonal conflicts into intrapersonal ones (Vanberg, 
1994, p. 170). 
However, the constitutionalist notion of a veil of uncertainty or ignorance, 
though useful as an analytical benchmark, is not very practical. It is not clear 
how genuine uncertainty or ignorance could be achieved in real-world consti-
tution formation. Therefore, it has been argued that the availability of exit 
options can ensure a competitive setting for participants in constitutional 
deliberations and can even substitute for a veil of uncertainty. This condition 
for efficiency can be given operational substance in processes of real-world 
constitution formation (Lowenberg and Yu, 1992). 
In order to produce an efficient social contract or constitution, delibera-
tions must be carried out in a competitive ’constitutional environment’. This 
condition will be satisfied if an exit option exists for each contracting party. 
This conclusion is quite consistent with the Wicksell-Buchanan-Vanberg 
contractarian consensus test. Only in a competitive setting does unanimous 
agreement acquire operational substance (normative content). 
Vanberg (1994) clearly recognizes that the true problem with the agree-
ment criterion is not that it is too demanding but, rather, that it has too little 
normative content. A criterion needs to be specified which allows one to 
distinguish between constraints that are judged to make the respective indi-
vidual choices involuntary, and those that do not. Vanberg’s analysis reaches 
the conclusion that a consistent normative-individualist approach needs to 
rely on a combined and simultaneous application of a purely procedural, 
rule-oriented, as well as a substantive, avoidance/exit cost criterion. The 
avoidance/exit cost perspective arguably provides a more operational specifi-
cation of the contractarian norm than the notion of a hypothetical contract to 
which Buchanan (1975, 1977) as well as Rawls (1971) appeal. 
The notion of exit has thus been invoked to give more operational sub-
stance to the concept of voluntary agreement. It is derived from Albert 
Hirschman’s (1970) classic distinction between exit and voice. Exit (and 
entry) is an important means by which individuals are able to express their 
preferences, and is precisely the method through which preferences are re-
vealed in competitive markets for private goods. An exit option introduces an 
element of market-like competition into the contracting process, which limits 
the ability of any party to wield power over another party. It is not even 
necessary that this exit option be exercised, since merely the threat of its use 
should be enough to restrain rent appropriation. The scope for opportunism is 
effectively constrained by competition, actual or potential. 236    The Elgar companion to law and economics 
Furthermore, it is argued that exit options can help to solve the constitu-
tional maintenance problem by establishing a competitive environment for 
post-constitutional political and market exchange (Lowenberg and Yu, 1992). 
Federalism, once again 
The strengthening of regional and local government relative to national gov-
ernment has been advocated by many scholars as an effective way to restrain 
the growth of legislative redistribution. The existence of separate jurisdic-
tions with some protected powers within a constitutional federation inhibits 
coercive behaviour by the government. Such an arrangement facilitates mi-
gration at low cost between federal subregions and thereby enhances 
competition between these subregions. The resulting mobility forces com-
petitive governmental units to supply public goods in preferred quantities and 
to ’price’ them broadly in line with relative marginal evaluations. 
The foregoing is related to the Tiebout effect (Tiebout, 1956), which says 
that individuals will sort themselves across communities in accordance with 
their preferences for the packages of taxes and public goods provided in each 
community. The ability of the owners of property rights to move to compet-
ing jurisdictions protects them from potential rent appropriation by a coercive 
government. Therefore, it is argued, a federalist constitution can effectively 
constrain the power of the state. In a federal system, citizens seeking political 
relief can vote with their feet. 
The preceding paragraphs suggest that post-contractual exit opportunities 
might be characterized in terms of Tiebout competition between different 
political groupings. If the constitution permits mobility and political plural-




1.  A classic overview of public choice theory is contained in Mueller (2003). 
2.  Thus Backhaus (1995) contains an analysis of constitutional guarantees of basic rights and 
procedures, illustrated by three constitutions, the American Constitution of 1789 as amended 
in 1792, the German Basic Law of 1949 and the Dutch Basic Law of 1983. In addition, 
reference can be made to several case studies. Holcombe (1991) analyses the role of 
constitutional rules as constraints on government using three US constitutions: the Articles 
of Confederation (1781), the Constitution of the United States and the Confederate Consti 
tution. Geoffrey Brennan and Jose Casas Pardo (1991) examine the Spanish constitution 
(1978). Sobel (1994) analyses the evolution of two international constitutions: the League 
of Nations Covenant and the United Nations Charter. 
3.  See, for example, Hefeker (1995); for some general reflections, see Eichengreen (1994). 
4.  The problem of time inconsistency has perhaps most notably been investigated in the 
context of central bank monetary policy; see in this connection Kydland and Prescott 
(1977) and also Barro and Gordon (1983a and 1983b). For a survey of subsequent 
elaborations and variations upon the same theme, see, for example, Walsh (2001, ch. 8, pp. 
321-84). 
5. In  The Power to Tax, Brennan and Buchanan argue that the existence of potentially huge 
rent-seeking costs constitutes one of the important arguments for predicting that all rational Constitutional economics II   23 7 
individuals, behind a veil of ignorance, would seek to constrain exploitation by revenue-
maximizing government to the maximum possible extent. The only way of doing so is to 
minimize the rents that accrue from ’governing’ - that is, by constraining Leviathan so that 
its surplus is minimal. Government ’surplus’, or the income that accrues to government for 
discretionary use, is defined as S = R - G, that is, the excess of revenue collections over 
spending on specified uses. Since G = αR, S = (1 - α)R, where α is the proportion of total 
revenues to be spent on specified public goods and services (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980 
[2000], ch. 2). 
6.  For what may now well become a standard general and formal treatment of the principal- 
agent model, see Laffont and Martimort (2002). 
7.  On the significance of the substitutability between intergovernmental competition for fiscal 
resources and explicit constitutional constraints on governmental taxing power, once the 
possibility of federalization is introduced, see Brennan and Buchanan, 1980 [2000], ch. 9. 
These authors’ emphasis is on federal assignment as a means of ensuring that individuals 
have available options as among the separate taxing-spending jurisdictions, and on the 
effect that the potential exercise of these options has on the total fiscal exploitation in the 
system. Total government intrusion into the economy should be smaller, ceteris paribus, 
the greater the extent to which taxes and expenditures are decentralized, the more homoge 
neous are the separate units, the smaller the jurisdictions, and the lower the net locational 
rents. (ibid., p. 216). 
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